2 Snowdon (2004) seems attracted to Propositionalism, though he does not explicitly advocate it. Brown (1970) holds that knows-how-to attributions are multiply ambiguous; he (seemingly) thinks that propositional knowledge is sufficient for at least some of these disambiguations to be true.
use of the phrase 'intellectualist legend', but I believe that 'Intellectualism' should be reserved for a broader set of views that include Propositionalism.
I then describe how our intuitions about knows-how-to ascriptions vary from context to context. I use this discussion to reply to several objections to my version of Propositionalism.
observations make the analysis of interrogative knowledge in (11) plausible. 6 
The Knowing-An-Answer Theory of Interrogative Knowledge
For all X, and all questions Q, necessarily, X knows Q iff X knows a proposition that answers Q.
Let us now return to our previous examples to find a more informative description of the sorts of propositions that are necessary and sufficient for knowing how to get to the Anchor Bar from
Jones's hotel.
Jones knows a proposition about how to get to the Anchor Bar from his hotel (namely the proposition that he can get to the Anchor Bar by exiting his hotel and turning left, and so on), and his knowing this proposition is sufficient for his knowing how to get to the Anchor Bar.
Moreover, the proposition that Jones knows seems (roughly speaking) to be an answer to the question of how to get to the Anchor Bar from his hotel. There may be propositions that are about how to get to the Anchor Bar that are not answers to the question of how to get there: one example may be the proposition that there is some way to get to the Anchor Bar from Jones's hotel. If there are such propositions, then knowing them is not sufficient for knowing how to get to the Anchor Bar. There are many other propositions that specify routes from the hotel to the Anchor Bar, and all (or many) of these answer the question of how to get to the Anchor Bar, and if Jones knows any of these alternative propositions, then he knows how to get to the Anchor Bar from his hotel. There may be yet other propositions concerning manners of getting to the Anchor Bar which do not concern routes for getting there, and yet count as answers to the 6 Schaffer (2008) has criticized a theory of interrogative knowledge similar to this. I believe that his arguments are flawed, for reasons I cannot take space to discuss here. question of how to get there, and knowing these is also sufficient for knowing how to get there.
For instance, Jones may know how to get to the Anchor Bar because he knows that he can get there by hailing a taxi. All of this suggests that knowing an answer to the question is sufficient for knowing how to get there.
Robinson and McDonald do not know any answers to the question of how to get to the Anchor Bar. They also fail to know how to get there from their hotel. So we can reasonably conclude that knowing an answer to the question is also necessary for knowing how to get there.
Generalizing on these thoughts, we arrive at a more informative analysis of knowing how to G. 
12.
The Knowing-An-Answer Theory of Knowing How to G For all X and all G, necessarily, X knows how to G iff X knows a proposition that answers the question of how to G. 
Answers
The Answer theory relies on the notion of a propositional answer to a question. Philosophers who accept the Answer theory may disagree over which propositions answer which questions.
They may also disagree on these matters with theorists who reject the Answer theory. To illustrate, let us consider an unembedded tensed interrogative sentence with an explicit subject, such as (14), and consider some candidate answers to it, such as the sentences in (15).
14. 
Contextual Variation in Judgments
There is another complication that we should keep in mind when evaluating the Answer theory and objections to it: our judgments about whether a given agent knows how to G vary from context to context. Consider again the sentences in (15), and the ascription of interrogative knowledge in (17).
17.
Jones knows how he can get to the Anchor Bar from his hotel.
Notice that (17) is not an ascription of knowledge-how-to. Suppose that Jones knows the proposition expressed by (15c), but does not know any more detailed proposition about how he can get to the Anchor Bar. Speakers' intuitions about whether (17) is true in such circumstances vary from context to context. In some contexts, typical speakers will take (17) to be true if Jones Similarly for ascriptions (16) and (17), on Contextualist theories: they express different propositions in different contexts, and so can vary in truth value from context to context. 10 9 There is another type of view, which I call 'ternarism' in Braun 2006, on which 'Jones knows who Twain is' varies in semantic content from context to context, but 'who Twain is' is not context-sensitive. I count such views as Contextualist here.
The differences in proposition expressed occur because, roughly, the speakers in some contexts are interested in certain sorts of answers to the question of how to get to the Anchor Bar, whereas the speakers in other contexts are interested in other sorts of answers. Presumably the contextsensitivity of (16) and (17) can be traced to the context-sensitivity of 'how Jones can get to the 10 The alleged context-sensitivity of (16) that I describe above is supposed to hold over Anchor Bar' and 'how to get to the Anchor Bar', and ultimately can be traced to the contextsensitivity of 'how'.
On the alternative view that I prefer, Invariantism, the sorts of answers that speakers are interested in changes from context to context, but this variation does not result in changes in the semantic content of ascriptions from context to context. Therefore, the preceding ascriptions do not change in truth value from context to context. Jones knows who Twain is as along as he knows an answer to the question of who Twain is; what counts as an answer to the question does not vary from context to context. However, in many contexts, the speakers are primarily interested in whether Jones knows certain particular answers to that question. If Jones does not know those answers, then the speakers of those contexts will not judge that Jones knows who Twain is, and will not mislead others in the context by saying that Jones knows who Twain is.
Similarly, for (16) and (17): these do not vary in content and truth value from context to context. But speakers' interests in particular answers to the relevant questions do vary. Speakers who are interested in whether Jones knows certain answers to the question of how to get to the Anchor Bar will tend not to (misleadingly) ascribe knowledge of how to get there to him if he does not know those answers. But the content and truth value of (16) and above any of the alleged ambiguities that I mentioned in note 8.
Invariantists and Contextualists agree that our intuitions about the truth of a single 'knows how to' ascription can vary from context to context. In my opinion, some who reject Propositionalism and the Answer theory fail to take this variability into account. It is easy to create contexts in which speakers will tend to judge that X knows how to G only if X knows the sorts of propositions about G that (typically) are known only by those who are able to G. In such contexts, it is easy to judge that being able to G is necessary for knowing how to G. Judgments For all X and all timeless manner questions Q, necessarily, X knows Q iff X knows a proposition that answers Q.
Both Contextualist and Invariantist theorists can accept this formulation.
11 I use the term 'timeless manner question' because the infinitival phrase 'how to G' is tenseless and (I assume) the question-like entities that it denotes lack temporal features possessed by the questions that tensed embedded interrogative sentences denote.
and Suzie know less detailed answers. Imagine, for instance, that Paul has seen a picture of a piano, but is otherwise quite ignorant of them and how they work. Suppose he asks Andrew how to play a piano. If Andrew answers that one can play a piano by pressing on its black and white keys, then Paul would be justified in saying that Andrew knows how to play a piano, even if Paul does not know whether Andrew has limbs that allow him to play piano, or whether Andrew has demonstrative knowledge of piano-playing of the sort I described above. Detailed knowledge of the sort that Andrew would express by using demonstratives is not necessary for knowing how to play piano. Parallel points hold for knowing how to ski and knowing how to sex chicks. Many people who are unable to ski, play piano, and sex chicks know (relatively undetailed) answers to the questions of how to ski, play piano, and sex chicks, and therefore also know how to ski, play piano, and sex chicks. 
19.
Suzie knows how to ski 20. Suzie knows an answer to the question of how to ski.
In some contexts, Suzie's knowledge of rather undetailed propositions concerning skiing is sufficient for both sentences to be true. In nearly all contexts, Suzie's demonstrative knowledge is sufficient to make both true. There are unusual contexts in which (20) is false, despite Suzie's demonstrative knowledge; in some of these unusual contexts, (20) is true only if Suzie knows a highly detailed proposition about skiing that she can express in non-demonstrative terms (in the way that good coaches can). But in such contexts (19) is also false, even though Suzie is able to ski. In these unusual contexts, the sentence 'Suzie is able to ski, but she doesn't know how to ski' is true. (Note that it is possible for a thing to be able to G without knowing how to G: my car is able to burn gasoline, but does not know how to do so.) Speakers have the intuition that (19) is true and (20) is false only when there is a shift in contexts between their two judgments.
Objection #2: Knowing Answers While Lacking Abilities
I have considered an objection that claims that propositional knowledge is not necessary for knowing how to G. John is unable to wiggle his ears, then he does not know how to wiggle his ears. This singular claim has some initial plausibility, even apart from the general principle.
In reply to this last objection, an Answer theorist should either say that John does know how to wiggle his ears (even though he is unable to do so) or he should say that John does not know an answer to the question of how to wiggle his ears. I favor the first reply. But which reply an Answer theorist prefers should depend on her view of answers, and perhaps on whether she takes 'knows how to' ascriptions to be context-sensitive.
John is unable to wiggle his ears, and knows little about ear-wiggling, yet we can think of contexts in which it would be natural to say that he does know how to wiggle his ears. Imagine that John is taking lessons from Ken on ear-wiggling. Ken: "Good, you know how to wiggle your ears".
In this context, Ken's attribution seems correct, simply because John knows the proposition that that is a way that John should wiggle his ears (demonstrating the way that Tom wiggles his ears).
We can imagine other contexts in which it would be natural to say 'John knows how to wiggle his ears' if John merely knows that he should wiggle his ears without touching them, or that he should wiggle his ears by moving them back and forth, rather than by flapping their tips up and down.
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On the Invariantist theory that I prefer, the proposition that John knows (namely, that
Tom's way of ear-wiggling is a way he should do it) is an answer to the question of how to wiggle John's ears. In some contexts we are interested in whether John knows this answer (or answers like it), whereas in other contexts we are uninterested in whether he knows this answer
But it has to be admitted that there are also conversational contexts in which a typical speaker would judge that 'John knows how to wiggle his ears' is true only if John is currently able to wiggle his ears or was at one time able to wiggle his ears.
(or answers like it). Our willingness to say and judge that John knows how to wiggle his ears changes as our interests change, but 'John knows how to wiggle his ears' semantically expresses a true proposition in all of these contexts. Therefore, in reply to the last objection to Koethe, I say that John does know how to wiggle his ears, because he knows an answer to the question of how to wiggle his ears. But Koethe has created a context in which we are uninterested in the answer that John happens to know. Irina's ice-skating coach has told her that one way in which she can do a salchow is to take off from the back inside edge of her skate, jump in the air, spin, and land on the back outside edge of her skate. What the coach says is true, and Irina is justified in believing it.
Therefore, Irina knows this proposition. Moreover, this proposition is an answer to the question of how to do a salchow. Therefore, if the Answer theory is true, then Irina knows how to do a salchow. However, Irina is confused. She thinks that her skate's front outside edge is its back inside edge, and that her skate's front inside edge is its back outside edge. 14 As a result, she makes mistakes when she judges whether other skaters are doing salchows, and she gives bad advice to other skaters about, for instance, which way to lean on their skates when they try to do 
22.
Alex: "I just read a book in which someone did a salchow, but the book did not say much about how to do them. How do you do a salchow?" the preceding argument against the Answer theory. Irina has a neurological deficit. Whenever she tries to take off from her front outer edge, she in fact takes off from her back inside edge, and whenever she tries to land on her front inside edge, she lands on her back outside edge. So whenever she attempts to do a salchow in the way that she (falsely) believes it should be done, she ends up doing a genuine salchow.
Ben: "You do a somersault on ice."
Cal: "No, you do a cartwheel on ice."
David: "No, you ski backwards down an ice-covered slope."
Irina: "No, a salchow is an ice-skating trick. To do it you jump and spin in midair in a certain way."
Eve: "Alex, I've watched many Winter Olympics on TV. Don't pay attention to Ben, Cal, and David: they don't know how to do a salchow. But Irina does."
Despite her confusion about inside edges, Irina clearly does know that one can do a salchow by jumping and spinning in mid-air in a certain way while skating. (She also knows that she can do a salchow in this way.) In the above context, her knowledge of this proposition seems sufficient for her to know how to do a salchow.
Given this contextual variation in our intuitions, what should we say about whether Irina knows how to do a salchow? On the Invariantist theory that I prefer, we should say that she does know how to do a salchow. In some contexts, the speakers are interested in whether she knows relatively undetailed answers to the question of how to do a salchow. In those contexts, the speakers are inclined to say (and think) that she knows how to do a salchow. Their judgments in these contexts are correct. In contexts in which the speakers are primarily interested in whether she knows more detailed answers, all of which partly concern the inside edges of skates, the speakers might be inclined to say that she does not. But these latter ascriptions are mistaken, even though they may correctly covey the true information that (a) she does not know the detailed propositions concerning skate-edges in which the speakers and hearers of the context are 
